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Overview of findings 
 
This study has been compiled as an internationally comparative contribution to the 
parliamentary inquiry by the Dutch Senate into the effects of privatization and agencification 
on the relationship between citizens and the (national) government. Knowledge on this topic 
is scarce and scattered across different sources. Therefore, this paper consists of three 
different sections. Each section deals with a different question and uses different sources. In 
this overview we summarize the main findings of the three sections. 
 
In section 1, we go into the unique focus of the parliamentary inquiry: the effect of 
privatization and agencification on the relationship between citizens and government. This is 
not only a unique focus, but the fact that the study is undertaken by Dutch parliament is also 
unique. A quick scan among foreign experts shows that there are no similar studies in other 
countries, neither by parliament nor by other parties, except for one German study by a civil 
servants assocation (see section 1 for details). 
 Academic research into agencification and privatization often pays attention to the 
effects for citizens as the customers of public services, but hardly ever to effects on the 
relationship between citizens and government. Recent findings related to the democratic 
deficit and the rise of new, horizontal accountability mechanisms may touch upon citizens' 
interests but there are too few findings to draw firm conclusions. 
 
Section 2 is based on an analysis of evaluation studies by governments, audit offices and 
academics into public management reforms. The creation of agencies is only one type of such 
reforms; 72 out of 500+ reports deal with agencies. There are two central questions in this 
section: what do we know about the effects of agencification in different countries, and is 
there a difference between effects in The Netherlands and other countries?  
 Unfortunately, many evaluation reports lack in details and specifics about agency 
performance and realization of objectives, in part because objectives were often not set at the 
time of agency creation. Therefore, there is no comprehensive or clear conclusion about the 
effects of agency creation. Some studies report improvements, others report deteriorations or 
no changes in for example steering and control by parent ministries, organizational stability, 
agency management and functioning.  
 Relatively little is known about 'democratic effects' of agency creation. There are but a 
few reports that pay attention to this topic, for example when they investigate issues such as 
accountability and transparency. Table 2.1 lists a number of findings from different studies, 
which shows that although agencification is an international trend, there are no general 
patterns as to the effects and outcomes thereof. 
 
Section 3 shows how the Dutch experiences with liberalization, privatization and 
agencification in a range of public domains compare to experiences in other (EU15) countries. 
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Data were collected at different points in time and should therefore be treated with some 
caution. However, there are some general patterns that can be identified. 
 The Netherlands are one of the forerunners in liberalisation and privatization in 
Europe (measured in 2007). However, Dutch citizens are not very satisfied with most of these 
public services (measured in 2006). Prior to a number of decisions to liberalize or privatize 
services, Dutch citizens expected positive effects on the quality and price of such services 
(measured in 1997), except for energy and gas. This could mean that citizens have been 
disappointed, or that services were already of good quality before privatization or 
liberalization.  
 In case of a number of social services, like employment services or care, the Dutch 
appreciate the affordability and quality of such services (measured in 2010), and the fact that 
these are still services for which government is responsible; they do not favour the 
responsibility for such services being delegated to non-government organizations.  
 Citizen trust in the government is generally fairly high in the Netherlands compared to 
other European countries, almost twice as high as the EU-average (measured in 2011). 
Similar findings are observed for trust in parliament. 
 
In sum, our analysis of the international (academic) literature on agencification and 
privatization shows that there has been little attention so far for 'democratic' effects of 
agencification and privatization, i.e. for citizens. This underscores the relevance of the Dutch 
parliamentary inquiry. Most studies focus on other issues, or look at effects for citizens as 
customers of public services. There are no apparent patterns in customer effects though; in 
some cases public service delivery has improved, in other cases not. This can partly be 
blamed on the lack of clear objectives that were set at the time of agencification or 
privatization, and perhaps also partly to the quality of service delivery prior to that decision. 
Anyway, there is no clear case to be made that agencification or privatization will 
automatically lead to better public service delivery. 
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Section 1 International comparison 
 
Sandra van Thiel 
 
In this section we investigate two questions. First, have similar studies like the Dutch 
parliamentary inquiry been carried out in other countries, and if so what were the results? And 
second, what can we learn from academic research into agencification and privatization 
regarding the effects on the relationship between citizens and the government? 
 
1.1. Parliamentary inquiries in other countries  
 
A quick scan among fifteen international experts1 shows that the Dutch parliamentary inquiry 
is a unique study, with a unique research question. A similar study has not yet been 
undertaken in other countries. This was confirmed by experts from Denmark, Australia, 
Ireland, Italy, France, Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, and Hungary.  
 In some countries, parliaments have undertaken studies into the topic of agencification 
and/or privatization but with a different angle, for example into the effects or effectiveness of 
competition, the number of privatizations and agencifications, evaluations of privatization and 
agencification programmes, the need to undo privatization and agencification, and changes in 
tariffs and quality of public services for customers. The UK parliament is probably one of the 
most active parliaments on this topic, as they have published several reports on agencification 
(or quangos as they are often referred to).2 Moreover, annual performance reviews of the 
Next-Steps Agencies allow members of parliament to scrutinize agency performance in close 
detail and in direct contact with agency CEOs. The Swiss parliament has recently 
commissioned a study into the privatization of Swisscom, SBB railways and the Swiss Postal 
service (report January 2012, in German). In Norway, a study was carried out about the 
relationship between the introduction of market type mechanisms and democracy (report in 
Norwegian only, titled 'Makt- og Demokrati Utredingen' 2003). And in Sweden several 
studies have been carried out by a range of committees, in some cases including some 
members of parliament, on for example the Constitutional position of agencies and the 
application of management by objectives. 
 Only in one country was a study published into the effects of privatization and 
agencification on the relationship between citizens and government, namely in Germany, but 
                                                 
1 The Cobra network is an international network of academics, who study agencification. Participants from 
almost 30 countries have participated in this network. From 2007 to 2011 the network received funding from the 
EU COST ACTION programme, grant number IS0601. The research findings were published in 2012 in a large 
edited volume "Government agencies: practices and lessons from 30 countries" (edited by Verhoest, Van Thiel, 
Bouckaert & Laegreid, and published by Palgrave MacMillan). See www.soc.kuleuven.be/io/cost for more 
information. 
2 See for example the latest report on the attempts of the new government (2010) to reduce the number of 
quangos: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-
select-committee/news/new-report-quangos/  
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this study was not commissioned by parliament but by the national German Civil Service 
Organization (DBB Beamtenbund und Tarifunion, 2011: p. 47-52).3 In this survey, citizens 
were asked about their opinion about privatization and agencification of a range of public 
services. The average German citizen supports a strong state (78%), does not want to privatize 
or agencify tasks such as police (98%), education (82%) and hospitals (65%), but would 
support privatization or agencification of energy delivery (41%), public transport (49%) and 
cultural tasks such as museums or theatres (54%). Privatization of the postal and telecommu-
nications services has improved their performance according to the German respondents 
(48%), but that does not apply to the railways (51% of respondents are dissatisfied). In most 
sectors, privatization and agencification have led to an increase in prices, according to the 
citizens. Overall, the majority (53%) of respondents would not like the government to change 
its current privation policy; 17% would favour more privatization, 26% less. 
 
All in all, the effects of agencification and privatization on the relationship between citizens 
and government have not been studied in most countries. 
 
1.2. Academic research on effects of privatization and agencification on the relationship 
between citizens and the government 
 
Most academic research into agencification and privatization focuses on other aspects of 
privatization and agencification than the effects on the relationship between citizens and 
government. Topics that are studied mostly are for instance: why do politicians decide to 
create agencies or privatize tasks or organizations; which (legal) types are established; and is 
this an international trend, pointing to convergence, or which differences can be found 
between different countries (see Verhoest et al., 2012; Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt & Talbot, 
2004; OECD, 2002)? In short, agencification and privatization are found in many if not all 
countries but there are no blueprints, neither in the way in which politicians take decisions nor 
in the design of the organizations involved. National politico-administrative traditions 
influence the trajectory and speed of agencification and privatization, but generally speaking 
it has been an international trend in most countries from the 1980s on, often referred to as one 
of the reforms in the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. 
 Other dominant topics in academic research are the autonomy and control of agencies, 
with special attention for the (new) regulatory agencies that have been established in response 
to privatization and liberalization of markets (see for example the work of Gilardi, 2002, 
2005). Findings show that agencies can be granted different levels and types of autonomy 
(managerial, personnel, financial, policy implementation; Verhoest et al., 2004) but there is 
no direct link between the actual level of autonomy (de facto) and the formal autonomy (by 
law). In practice, some agencies will operate more autonomously than their official statute 
                                                 
3 The reader should remember that Germany is a federal country. Privatization and agencification at the federal 
level does occur but is probably even more common at the Länder level. The survey report does not mention 
whether citizens were asked about services at the national/federal level or at the Länder level. 
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allows. For example, agencies may try to influence the development of new policies by 
developing legislative proposals, making information public, lobbying with interest groups 
and/or politicians, and so on (Verschuere, 2009).  
 As far as the control of agencies is concerned, research findings show a mixed picture; 
parent ministries are most involved in the steering of agencies, but do not always seem aware 
or capable of performing this function successfully. Steering requires new competencies and 
the development of new organizational arrangements and instruments that fit with the more 
horizontal and business-like relationship with agencies (Verhoest et al., 2012, Van Thiel & 
Pollitt, 2007). A good balance between letting go and maintaining a relationship is necessary 
but difficult to find, particularly as there is little exchange of best practices between 
governments (at all levels). 
 Most recently, research has been focussed on the dissolution and merger of agencies, 
as this is the latest trend in agencification policies in most (European) countries, also known 
as the 'rationalization' of agencies. Many governments are confronted with a highly 
fragmented public sector as a result of agencification and privatization. A lack of coordination 
and cooperation, particularly in case of cross-sectoral policy problems, has led governments 
to reconsider their decisions to create agencies or privatize organizations. Contrary to the 
rhetoric, however, this has not led to large re-nationalizations but rather to large-scale 
reshuffling of agencies for example through mergers and the creation of shared service centres 
(cf. Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). This latest trend fits with the post-NPM movement or 
whole-of-government approach that tries to re-establish coordination across the public sector. 
 
The performance of agencies is generally understudied (James & Van Thiel, 2011) as well as 
the effects for citizens. Studies into the performance of privatized organizations do pay 
attention to effects for customers; see for example the PIQUE project which compares 
privatization in four sectors in six countries (www.pique.at). This study shows however that 
there is little uniformity in outcomes; prices, quality, and accessibility of services improve in 
some cases, but not in others (see also section 2 in this report). Other findings relate to (1) the 
increased need for regulation of markets, to protect customers from imperfect competition and 
create a level-playing field for companies, (2) effects on the legal position of employees, such 
as social dumping and low-wage competition and (3) a call for more empowerment of citizens 
to monitor and influence quality aspects of public services. The latter prescription fits with the 
rise of new, so-called horizontal, accountability mechanisms (Schillemans, 2008) that have 
been developed bottom-up, by agencies, for different reasons. 
 One motive for agencies to invest in horizontal accountability instruments refers to the 
democratic deficit; because ministerial accountability for agencies is limited but agencies are 
not held to account for their performance directly, there is a gap in democratic accountability 
(Skelcher, 2007; Vibert, 2007, Flinders, 2008). New mechanisms and instruments have been 
developed to repair this deficit, such as quality charters (specifying the rights of customers, 
for example to good and quick service, or the right to file a complaint, and so on), boards or 
panels of advisors (consisting of citizens, interest groups and other stakeholders), and public 
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assessments or benchmarks (see www.publiekverantwoorden.nl for a Dutch example). 
Proponents of horizontal accountability further claim that it fits with the intentions of 
delegating responsibilities - and hence accountability - to agencies. However, there are also 
more strategic motives that can be discerned. For example, agencies can use information 
about their performance to build up a reputation, to gain more influence in the policy domain 
and/or acquire new or more tasks from politicians or other (private) stakeholders. 
Alternatively, information about (good) performance can be used to counter the overall 
negative publicity that agencies get in the media (Deacon & Monk, 2001).  Knowledge on the 
rise of these new accountability mechanisms and the effects thereof is still limited, so we 
cannot draw firm conclusions here. 
 
In sum, there is not much research into the effects of agencification and privatization on the 
relationship between citizens and government. The focus of most research is on other topics, 
questions and angles. In some cases, this may touch upon effects for citizens, like the call for 
empowerment of customers or the rise of horizontal accountability instruments. There is 
however insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on 'democratic' effects of agencification 
and privatization. 
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Section 2 The effects of agencification in Europe: a review of the evidence 
 
Sorin Dan and Christopher Pollitt 
 
2.1. The effects of agencification: an introduction 
 
To ask what the effects of agencification have been may seem like a straightforward question, 
but actually it is anything but. There are two principle groups of reasons why it is hard to 
answer: the first have to do with meaning and the second with evidence. To put it very briefly, 
the terms ‘agency’ and ‘effects’ have both been used with a range of meanings, so we have to 
be careful to specify what we are talking about at any particular point. And when we come to 
evidence, we find that although a great deal has been written about agencies – both by 
governments and by academics – the hard evidence is patchy, and, in particular, it thins out 
very rapidly the further we move away from the immediate organizational mechanics of 
setting up agencies and out into the wider world of their actual effects on efficiency, service 
quality and citizens’ attitudes to public services and government. 
 On the question of meanings, we may briefly note that it has long been recognised that 
there is no standardized international view of what is an ‘agency’ (Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt 
and Talbot, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2012, pp. 18-21). There is no widely shared legal or 
constitutional category that ensures that (say) the British, the Dutch, the French and the 
Germans are all talking about the same thing. Neither is the cultural and political meaning of 
agencification similar in all countries or periods. For example, a detailed study of key official 
documents on agencification in Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden came to the 
conclusion that debates about why agencification was necessary and what it meant were quite 
different in each case (Smullen, 2010). Or again, during the 1990s in the UK, agencification 
was widely seen as giving blocks of operational activity more autonomy from ministries, 
while in the Netherlands one current of thought was that agencification was attractive because 
it placed such activities under closer ministerial supervision than would putting them into the 
then popular ZBO format (Van Thiel and Pollitt, 2007). A study of agencies operating in the 
same sectors in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK showed that even where 
agencies had similar performance indicator systems, the status of these systems and the ways 
in which they were used varied considerably (Pollitt et al., 2004). This means that 
international lesson drawing is difficult, because similar-looking organizational structures or 
performance management systems may actually be operated in different ways. 
 For the purposes of this report we will adopt what has become a fairly standard 
definition of an agency (Van Thiel, 2012, pp. 18-20; see also Pollitt et al., 2004). For us it is a 
public sector organization which is: 
1. Structurally disaggregated from government ministries 
2. Operates under more businesslike conditions than the core government bureaucracy 
Such organizations operate at arms’ length from the core of government and undertake public 
tasks such as service delivery, regulation and policy implementation. 
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Before we can go on to discuss evidence we also have to say what meaning we are giving to 
effects. We will here be using a particular categorisation of effects (quite a normal one, but 
certainly not the only one). We will divide them into three broad types: 
• Activities/processes (e.g. budgeting, making accountability statements; organising to 
produce services; training staff) 
• Outputs (e.g. treatments/lessons/inspection/information delivered to service users; 
grants and loans issued)  
• Outcomes (e.g. improved health status for citizens; better economic growth; 
educational attainments for students; increased citizen satisfaction with the quality of 
services) 
An organization or programme is conceived as a set of activities or processes. These include 
organizational arrangements like the division of responsibility, the allocation of authority, the 
standard operating procedures, and so on. These procedures enable the organization to deploy 
and redeploy its resources (staff, money, buildings etc.) which are collectively termed inputs. 
From these activities and processes the organization or programme then produces a set of 
outputs, which could, for example be lessons (in a school), licenses (from a licensing agency), 
medical treatments (from a hospital) and so on. These outputs are, in a sense, what the 
organization ‘gives’ to the outside world – to citizens, to civil society associations and to 
business firms. They are like messages, passing across the membrane that separates (on the 
one hand) the state from (on the other) the market sector and civil society. Outputs are 
invariably intended to produce desirable outcomes, beyond the organization or programme – 
so school lessons are supposed to produce educated students and hospital-provided medical 
treatments are supposed to produce the cure or the alleviation of ill-health. An outcome is 
something that happens in the world outside the organization and the programme: it is an 
effect ‘out there in the real world’.  
 The performance of organizations and programmes (the value of their activities) is 
usually thought of in terms of certain relationships between these inputs, outputs and 
outcomes. Thus the ratio between inputs and outputs is a measure of efficiency (or ‘technical’ 
efficiency or ‘X-efficiency’, or ‘productivity’). If you can get more outputs for the same 
inputs, you have achieved an efficiency gain. If you can maintain steady outputs while 
reducing inputs you have also achieved an efficiency gain – in both cases the ratio between 
inputs and outputs improves. Effectiveness, however, is a different concept, which is usually 
conceived as the degree to which the outcomes match the original goals or objectives set for 
the organization of programme. As many writers have remarked, if goals are multiple, 
conflicting or ambiguous then it will be difficult to determine effectiveness, which will, in 
effect, become a ‘contested concept’. Unfortunately, policy goals frequently are multiple, 
conflicting or ambiguous, not least because that is what politicians may need to get sufficient 
agreement to launch the policy in the first place. (This certainly includes public management 
reforms which are often claimed to be all things to all men – to save money, raise service 
quality, increase effectiveness, etc.).  
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 Effectiveness and efficiency by no means always move together. It is perfectly 
possible to carry through reforms which improve effectiveness but which do not affect 
efficiency, or which even reduce efficiency. Similarly, it is wholly conceivable that one can 
make changes that will increase efficiency, but also lead to some loss of effectiveness.  Few 
studies actively discuss and analyses such trade-offs. 
 Another point to be borne in mind is that, increasingly, official reports and 
evaluations, as well as academic studies, make use of complex indices of performance, which 
combine two or more elements (see e.g. Audit Commission, 2009; Pollitt, 2011; Van de Walle 
et al., 2008). These aggregated indices can be very useful to busy decision makers or to non-
specialists and citizens, but they may also (deliberately or inadvertently) conceal underlying 
trades-off between two or more desirable values (e.g. equity versus efficiency). They can also 
give spurious precision to judgments which are more correctly seen as hedged about by quite 
wide brackets of uncertainty (Jacobs and Goddard, 2007).  
 When assessing effects there is also frequently a problem of attribution. That is to say, 
there may be evidence of, say, an increase in efficiency, but what exactly was the cause? If 
the creation of an agency structure was the only thing that happened during the relevant time 
period, then the efficiency gain might be plausibly attributed to that new structure. But if there 
were other developments at the same time (e.g. technological changes; a new management; a 
government-wide efficiency drive, etc.) then it can be very hard to assess what share of the 
efficiency gain (if any) should be attributed to agencification. This problem of multiple 
possible causes is actually very common in public management reform. And it tends to get 
worse the further one moves from changes in processes to changes in outputs to changes in 
outcomes. That is one reason why the whole history of tracing changes in outcomes and (even 
outputs) to structural changes in public sector organizations has been a disappointing one 
(Pollitt, 2009).  
 The proponents of agency reform were sometimes quite vague about exactly what 
agencification was supposed to achieve (e.g. Pollitt et al., 2004; Van Thiel, 2001). On other 
occasions, however, a variety of positive claims were made. In particular, agencification has 
been seen as a route to economies (input minimization) to more professional management 
(better processes), to greater efficiency (an improved input/output ratio), and to higher 
customer responsiveness and service quality (better outcomes). As we shall see the evidence 
becomes thinner the further one moves towards outcomes – we know much more about how 
the creation of agencies affected the internal relations within ministries than we do about how 
they actually changed service quality. Even the large scale surveys involved in COBRA 
(extensively reported later in this document) were mainly gathering data from officials about 
processes and outputs, not from citizens about outcomes (Verhoest et al., 2012).  
 Thus we can already see that there are likely to be significant problems in assembling 
convincing evidence of the effects of agencification. Evidence on outcomes is likely to be 
much more scarce and difficult to collect than evidence on internal activities and processes, 
with evidence on outputs somewhere in between. Even where evidence of outcomes exists the 
attribution of it to one particular form of change – agencification – can be highly problematic. 
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More fundamentally still, agencification has meant rather different things in different 
countries, and the desired effects (objectives) of agency reform have been various and often 
rather vague. 
 All these difficulties and challenges do not, however, mean that we know nothing. On 
the contrary, many studies of agencies have been carried out and they have much to teach us. 
We may not be able to answer the ‘ultimate’ questions about the final outcomes for citizens 
with any great certainty or accuracy, but we can identify a whole series of influences that 
seem, in given national or sectoral contexts, to promote or hinder the smooth working of 
agencies. In the next section we turn to these influences and contexts. 
 
2.2. The evidence 
 
Having sketched the ‘big picture’ above, in this section we come to the evidence itself. We 
will draw principally upon a major database assembled during 20114 and consisting of 520 
studies of the impacts of New Public Management (NPM) reforms across Europe. Of course 
not all these studies are relevant to agencification – agencification is not the only element 
within the NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 9-11) – but it is one important part of the 
NPM agenda, and the database contains a total of 72 studies which refer to agencies in 
various European countries.  
 The main findings contained in these studies have been summarized in Table 1 below. 
We selected the studies which appeared to provide more convincing evidence about effects of 
agencification. Thus we did not include studies from the entire database of 520 studies of 
NPM reforms that do not deal directly with agencies. Table 1 includes effects of 
agencification as reported in each of the studies listed in the table (see column ‘Source’). Each 
row in Table 1 contains at least one study. All the information contained in a particular row 
refers to each particular study (or in a few cases more than one study) listed in the ‘Source’ 
column.  
 
                                                 
4 More information about the database and access to the actual database on which this analysis is based can be 
consulted on the website of the European Commission’s FP7-funded Coordinating for cohesion in the public 
sector of the future (COCOPS) project at www.cocops.eu.  
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Table 2.1. Effects of agencification in Europe 
Country What was evaluated? What were the expectations? What were the effects?1 Source 
Evaluation of Flexibilisierungsklausel, 
budget execution within a framework of 
performance agreements and targets. 
Agencification more generally. 
Federal administration level, various 
policy areas 
Improved efficiency  
Deteriorated organizational stability  
Insufficient steering by parent ministries  
Improved agency-level management  
Increased savings (mostly staff reductions) 
Increased customer service 
Unchanged role of performance indicators in 
steering 
Hammerschmid et al., 2008; 
Hammerschmid et al., 2011; 
Rossmann, 2001; Rossmann 
and Leitsmüller, 2010 
Austria 
Agencification more generally in various 
policy areas 
Increased managerial autonomy and use of 
performance targets and agreements would 
increase efficiency, effectiveness, innovation 
and professionalism. 
 
Reduced transparency (shadow budgets) 
Reduced parliamentary control of agencies 
Unchanged or at most minor improvements in 
efficiency and savings 
Reduced steering by parent ministries and  
internal control 
Rising cost of top executives 
Greiling, 2011 
Unchanged innovative activity and behavior 
by state agencies. No significant differences in 
results found between Flanders and Norway. 
Lægreid et al., 2011 
Comparative study covering 
Flanders and Norway 
Increased fragmentation in policy and 
management. Coordination decreased in all 
countries but to various degrees depending on 
how much agencification was promoted (more 
in the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and New 
Zealand than in Belgium and France) and the 
coordination mechanisms chose in response, 
e.g. high central steering power in France. 
Bouckaert et al., 2010  
In addition to Belgium, it 
includes France, Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK (plus New 
Zealand and the USA) 
Diminished transparency stemming from a 
high number of organizational forms 
Decreased policy cohesion, communication, 
collaboration and service integration 
Spanhove and Verhoest, 2008 
Innovative culture of state agencies and 
factors influencing it. Agencification 
more generally affecting various policy 
areas. Most of the studies cover only the 
Flemish region of Belgium.  
It was expected that greater autonomy of 
agencies and increased control of results by 
parent ministry would foster innovation, 
specialization and expertize which would lead to 
better performance. 
Improved innovative activity and behavior of 
state agencies 
 
Verhoest et al., 2007 
Belgium 
 
 
The performance of a Flemish 
employment services agency
Managerial autonomy, results control, financial 
incentives and competition would lead to better
Improved effectiveness (meeting objectives) of 
the job brokerage division but less so in the
Verhoest, 2005 
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Unchanged equal access – limited 
representation of hard-to-place job seekers 
Evaluation of performance contracts 
between six Flemish agencies and the 
Flemish Government for 2008. Various 
policy areas. 
Limited use of performance contracts for 
control  
Problematic quality of performance contracts 
and of monitoring and evaluation processes. 
Vlaams Parlement, 2009 
Evaluation of performance contracts for 
social security agencies 
The introduction of performance contracts 
would make the control relationship between 
ministries and agencies more result-oriented. Insufficient role played by the state in 
negotiating performance contracts, setting 
objectives and monitoring. 
Rekenhof, 2005 
Regional hospital agency of Brittany 
Too tight central control of agencies, lack of 
managerial flexibility of agencies in 
negotiation 
Improved overall cohesion and common action 
Dumond and Jourdain, 2006 
More substantial communication between 
agencies and stakeholders leading to improved 
accountability and transparency 
Improved professionalization of the 
management of regional agencies 
Improved service coordination 
Fargeon et al., 2002 
France 
 
See also the 
row for 
Belgium for an 
additional 
comparative 
study 
 
Creation of regional hospital agencies 
more generally 
Setting up flexible decentralized/deconcentrated 
autonomous agencies would better respond to 
local needs. They were designed to have a 
regulatory role and were tasked to restructure the 
health system. 
Unclear effect on equal access to services 
Unclear effects on cost containment and 
quality of service 
Minvielle, 2006 
Hungary Agencies under the ministry level in various policy areas  
More complex than just the typical expectations 
of public choice theorists. It includes political 
reasons such as search for legitimacy in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
Decreased organizational stability due to 
specialization and fragmentation  Gyrgy, 2010 
Netherlands 
 
See also the 
rows for 
Belgium and 
the UK for 
additional 
comparative 
studies 
Agencification more generally. Various 
policy areas 
Increase in managerial autonomy of executive 
agencies would lead to greater efficiency and 
responsiveness 
Improved managerial innovation 
Improved result-oriented steering  
Increased savings  
Lowered organizational stability 
Kraak and van Oosteroom, 
2002 
Norway 
 
See also the 
row for
Creation of a decentralized health model 
where a high degree  of autonomy was 
t d t i l d l l h lth it
The organization of hospitals as health 
enterprises with decentralized, semi-autonomous 
t ld i ffi i
Higher managerial and financial autonomy of 
hospitals  
Hi h liti l t l f h lth t i
Lægreid et al., 2003 
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bureaucracy would foster change. 
Belgium for an 
additional 
comparative 
study that 
covers Norway
Creation of single purpose organizations 
in  various policy areas more generally 
 
Reforms were driven less by economic reasons 
than in other countries (e.g. New Zealand in this 
case) and more by interest in becoming part of 
an international reform trend of autonomization 
with increasing managerial autonomy offered to 
agencies 
Improved productivity (but limited evidence) 
Coordination, capacity and fragmentation 
problems 
Undermined central political control and 
weaker executive political leadership 
compared to agency leadership 
 
Christensen, 2001 
Christensen and Lægreid, 
2009 
Sweden 
 
See also the 
row for 
Belgium for an 
additional 
study that 
includes 
Sweden 
 
Evaluation of the management by results 
model with a focus on agencification. 
Various policy areas. 
Rational choice principles and expectations: 
disaggregation to create savings, improve 
efficiency and responsiveness.  
Enhanced understanding by ministries of 
activities of agencies 
Improved awareness of agencies towards 
results 
Unclear and inadequate reporting requirements 
developed by ministries 
Poor link between inputs and outcomes 
Sundstrm, 2007 
More general review of effects of 
agencification and of other NPM reforms 
in various policy areas 
Overall, rational choice principles and 
expectations: disaggregation to create savings, 
improve efficiency and responsiveness. 
A statistical averaging of studies of the effects 
of agencification on efficiency finds efficiency 
‘up’ in more cases than ‘down’, but the largest 
category is ‘unchanged’. 
Andrews, 2010 
In addition to the UK it 
includes examples from 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Canada, USA and South 
Korea. 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
The creation of executive agencies in 
various policy areas of central 
government (Next Steps Programme) 
The expectations were that greater autonomy, 
within a framework of targets, would produce 
greater efficiency, improved customer focus, 
quality and professionalism to the management 
and delivery of central government services.  
Improved accountability of agency chief 
executives for the achievement of targets 
within budgets due to framework agreements 
Improved  efficiency (limited evidence) 
Improved cultural change, i.e. more focused 
management  
Higher gap between parent ministry and 
Office for Public Service 
Reform, 2002 
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Notes: 1Throughout the table the outcomes of agencification and the effects on legitimacy and accountability have been listed in italics. Most of the effects on legitimacy and accountability, 
as noted in section III of the report concern accountability and legitimacy between ministries and their agencies rather than legitimacy and accountability towards society. 
 
 
in some cases due to agencies pursuing their 
own targets too strongly 
Service integration has become more difficult 
in many cases 
Improved accountability and transparency 
through framework agreements 
Unchanged efficiency 
Improved processes (e.g. processing claims) in 
some cases 
Increased customer focus and culture in some 
cases 
Poor informational exchanges affecting 
coordination between ministry and agency 
James, 2003 
Evaluation of 12 service delivery 
organizations (agencies) in education, 
health and social housing. Greater 
autonomization of local service delivery.  
The split between purchasers and providers, with 
granting of some degree of managerial 
autonomy to providers was expected to foster 
competition which was expected to lead to 
greater efficiency and customer responsiveness.  
Some decline in equity, i.e. access to public 
services 
Intensification of activity, i.e. faster processes  
Increased fragmentation within the three 
sectors 
Pollitt et al., 1998 
Agencification more generally covering 
four sectors: prisons, meteorology, 
forestry and social security and four 
countries: Finland, Netherlands, Sweden 
and the UK.  
Increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
executive operations through the creation of 
semi-autonomous agencies operating within 
contractual frameworks. 
Somewhat enhanced accountability due to 
contractual frameworks and performance 
measures 
Enhanced transparency through more 
understandable annual reporting of agencies  
Improved performance (more generally as 
perceived by managers) 
Increasing availability of performance 
indicators (PIs) in all four countries but in the 
UK they were used more intensively and 
extensively than in the other three countries. 
However, little use of PIs as steering 
mechanisms by ministries in all countries.  
Pollitt et al., 2004 
Pollitt, 2006 
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2.3. Conclusions 
 
What does the evidence reported in Table 2.1 ultimately show about the effects of the creation 
of agencies in Europe? First, it shows that the effects of agencification have been complex in 
scope and direction, with improvements in some cases and deteriorations or insignificant 
changes in others. Second, it indicates that relatively little is known about outcomes, i.e. 
effects outside the administrative system and the so-called ‘democratic effects’, i.e. effects on 
legitimacy and accountability towards society (Van Thiel et al., 2012, pp. 432-5). Next we 
will draw conclusions about each of these three categories of effects, namely: i) changes in 
processes/activities, ii) in outputs and iii) in outcomes, including effects on legitimacy and 
accountability towards society.  
 
Effects on processes/activities 
In many cases improvements have been observed in the management and professionalism of 
agencies, in the availability of performance indicators and information (although their use is 
often limited), customer focus, awareness of the need to focus on results rather than rules and 
procedures, or in the innovative activity of agencies. These improvements span multiple 
countries and policy areas, however, no consistent pattern of improvements has been found 
that is specific to a country or sector.  
 However, the evidence on processes/activities also includes many cases where 
deteriorations have been observed. Often they are trade-offs of observed improvements. These 
effects are not specific to a country or set of countries or policy areas either.  They include 
deteriorations in organizational stability (increased fragmentation), steering by parent 
ministries, policy cohesion, ministry-agency collaboration and communication. The picture 
therefore is more complex than the proponents of agencification had envisaged.  
 
Effects on outputs, savings and efficiency 
Compared to evidence on processes/activities, relatively less is known about the effects of 
agencification on outputs. Often the claims about outputs are methodologically less 
convincing than those about changes in processes/activities. Nevertheless, some studies in our 
database have found such evidence. For instance, a number of studies of agencies in Austria 
have found improvements in savings and efficiency (see data for Austria in Table 2.1). Other 
studies in Belgium and the UK have found unchanged effects on efficiency or at most minor 
improvements. This finding is one key conclusion in a recent review article which found that 
the largest category of effects of agencification on efficiency in a number of European and 
non-European countries is ‘unchanged’ (Andrews, 2010).  
 
Effects on outcomes and on legitimacy and accountability towards society  
The evidence on what citizens ultimately ‘get’ from agencification is limited and patchy. Only 
a few studies have assessed (or attempted to assess) these ultimate effects on citizens. 
Conclusions about the outcomes of agencification seem to be highly context-specific as in the 
case of increased effectiveness of the job brokerage division of the Flemish employment 
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agency analysed in Verhoest (2005). For emphasis, these effects on outcomes and 
accountability and legitimacy have been written in bold. The effects on accountability and 
transparency are equally complex, but there seems to be a pattern here: in Austria and 
Belgium studies have reported deteriorations while most evidently in the UK improvements 
have been found. However, most of these studies look at ‘internal’ accountability and 
legitimacy between ministries and their agencies rather than at accountability and legitimacy 
externally, towards citizens. Very few have looked at democratic effects, such as reduced 
parliamentary control of agencies in Austria (Greiling, 2011); better communication between 
agencies and stakeholders leading to improvements in transparency and accountability of the 
acitivities of French regional hospital agencies (Fargeon et al., 2002) and in the UK following 
the Next Steps programme (James, 2003; Office for Public Service Reform, 2002; Pollitt, 
2006; Pollitt et al., 2004). 
 
The Dutch experience with agencification has been both similar and different from that of 
other European countries. More generally it has been similar in as far as it fits within a larger, 
international trend towards autonomization and performance that has swept with varying 
intensities across Europe and the world (Verhoest et al., 2012). Arguably, a number of other 
similarities with other countries exist (see e.g., Van Thiel and Pollitt, 2007 for an Anglo-
Dutch comparison of agencies). However, the Dutch case retains its specificity. For instance, 
in the Netherlands the appeal to and force of performance indicators has been softer than in 
the UK but harder than in Finland and Sweden (Pollitt, 2006). Some of the studies listed in 
Table 2.1 have analysed such similarities and differences systematically, but very few have 
succeeded in linking them to the outcomes of agencification. This is due in part to the 
difficulty of attributing outcomes to changes in agencies. The key final question that we can 
only briefly address here is ‘what is distinctive, if anything, about the effects of agencification 
in the Netherlands?’ Comparative studies of agencies in the database have often alluded to 
(and in a few cases analysed systematically) contextual factors influencing effects, such as the 
politico-administrative culture, structure of the political system, quality of leadership, the task 
of agency, budget size and political sensitivity. ‘Adjusting’ these factors, and possibly others, 
in the right direction, can prove instrumental for the success of agencification. To increase the 
probability of a positive result from agencification it would seem prudent to combine general 
knowledge about how agencies have fared in other countries with strong local knowledge of 
and ‘feel’ for these other factors. There is no single ‘best practice’ model that can be 
helicoptered in to solve a local problem – prudent reformers adapt and tune the broad idea of 
agencification to the specific needs and possibilities of here and now. 
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Section 3 Public opinions on privatization and liberalization 
 
Sebastian Jilke, Roxanne van Delft, Steven Van de Walle 
 
This section summarises public opinion data in European countries on liberalisation of public 
services, as collected through the Eurobarometer surveys and the European Commission’s 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey. The purpose of this part is to show how citizens in the 
Netherlands look at privatisation and liberalisation as compared to citizens of other countries. 
Where possible, the document will also highlight some trends, where the data permits. In 
section 3.2 we provide an overview on the degree of public service liberalisation in 22 EU 
member countries. In section 3.3, we show a number of statistics on public attitudes towards 
public services and liberalisation in the EU 15. 
 
3.1. Background: Extent of liberalisation in selected sectors in European countries 
 
In this section we provide an overview of the degree of service liberalisation in 22 EU 
member countries for the following sectors: telecommunications, electricity, gas, postal and 
rail services. The index is taken from the OECD’s indicators of regulation in energy, transport 
and communications (ETCR) (cf. Conway, Nicoletti 2006). The indicators we display are 
composed of a subset of sub-indicators (among others, measures of market entry regulation, 
market structure and public ownership), and can be interpreted as providing a comprehensive 
picture of the state of liberalisation within the envisaged service sector. The index ranges 
between zero and six, with “6” standing for a low degree of liberalisation and “0” for total 
liberalisation. 
 
Figure 3.1: Degree of liberalisation – overall ETCR score 2007 
 
The first figure displays the overall ETCR score for the non-manufacturing sectors and hence 
shows the overall degree of service liberalisation within countries. Not surprisingly, the 
United Kingdom (UK) ranks as the country which has undertaken the deepest liberalisation 
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reforms in its service sectors. The Netherlands as well ranges at the forefront of liberalizing 
countries. Other countries, such as Greece or Slovenia have only partially liberalized their 
service sectors which resulted in a comparatively high ETCR score of 3 and above. The 
following figures will give a more detailed understanding of this pattern. 
 
Figure 3.2: Degree of liberalisation in telecommunications, ETCR score 2007 
 
Within the telecommunication sector, the UK is still the most liberalised country, and the 
Dutch telecommunication sector is only slightly less liberalized. Luxembourg and Slovenia 
are the least liberalised countries in this sector. 
 
Figure 3.3: Degree of liberalisation in electricity, ETCR score 2007 
 
As regards the electricity sector, the UK is still at the forefront of service liberalisation. 
However, the Netherlands ranges here only within the bottom half of the countries. This 
exemplifies the comparatively moderate degree of liberalisation in the Dutch electricity sector 
at that time. Sweden and Estonia are the countries with the least liberalized electricity sector. 
 21
 
Figure 3.4: Degree of liberalisation in the gas sector, ETCR score 2007 
 
A similar pattern can be observed within the gas sector. The UK is again the most liberalized 
country, while the Netherlands has a rather moderately liberalized gas sector. Within Greece 
and Finland, liberalisation reforms in the gas market have not been very extensive.  
 
Figure3.5: Degree of postal liberalisation, ETCR score 2007 
 
In the postal sector, the Netherlands is the most liberalized country. In this sector, a great 
share of countries only had partial liberalisation reforms, such as the UK, Hungary and Italy. 
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Figure 3.6: Degree of liberalisation in the rail sector, ETCR score 2007 
 
In the rail sector, again, the UK is the most liberalized country. But also the Netherlands has 
executed deep liberalisation reforms, which are reflected in its low ETCR score. Ireland, 
Slovenia and Finland are the least liberalized countries. 
 
All in one it can be said that within the Netherlands liberalisation reforms have been 
implemented comparatively deep in the rail, telecommunications and postal sectors. In the 
electricity and gas sectors, liberalisation reforms have only been partially implemented. 
 
3.2. Citizen attitudes towards public services and privatisation 
 
In this section we look at a number of statistics about public attitudes towards public services 
and liberalisation/privatisation. We use data from the Eurobarometer surveys 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/) and the Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007. These 
surveys are regularly commissioned by the European Commission about topical issues. 
Liberalisation and competition in public services has been a recurrent topic in these surveys. 
Eurobarometer surveys approximately 1000 respondents per country. In the figures and tables 
we show both positive and negative opinions in order to facilitate cross-country comparisons, 
because item non-response and ‘don’t know’ percentages vary across countries. We limit the 
analysis to the EU15 countries. Years vary, but we in general use the most recent data 
available. Aspects of these data have been analysed in depth, especially with regard to 
universal service delivery and price satisfaction. We refer to the relevant literature for these 
analyses (see e.g., Bacchiocchi et al., 2008; Brau et al., 2007; Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2010; 
Fiorio and Florio, 2008; Jilke and Van de Walle, 2012; Van de Walle, 2006; 2009; Van de 
Walle et al., 2008). Further analyses on explaining public attitudes to privatisation, using ISSP 
data, can be found in the work of Battaglio (Battaglio, 2009; Battaglio and Legge, 2009). For 
the figures on satisfaction with services of general interest in section 3.0, we use a dedicated 
survey, again organised by the European Commission. 
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3.2.1. General trust in government and satisfaction with public services 
 
Before presenting evidence about public expectations and preferences towards privatisation, 
we first provide some background through presenting a number of cross-national opinion 
statistics on satisfaction with services of general interest, and trust in government. 
 
Figure 3.7: Trust in government 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 74, QA12b.4, Nov. 2011 
 
Trust in government in the Netherlands is fairly high compared to other countries. In the most 
recent Eurobarometer poll, 48 per cent of the Dutch indicate they tend to trust their 
government, 48 per cent say they tend not to trust it. The EU15 average stands at 28 per cent. 
This confirms the position of the Netherlands as a high-trust country. 
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Figure 3.8: Trust in parliament 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 74, QA12b.5, Nov. 2011 
 
We see similar findings for trust in parliament. Fifty-five per cent tend to trust parliament in 
the Netherlands (40 per cent tend not to trust). 
 
The European Commission has also organised a large number of polls on attitudes towards 
services of general interest. These polls measured attitudes such as general satisfaction, price 
satisfaction, ease of switching and complaining etc. The volume of these polls was especially 
high at times when markets were widely being opened for competition. More recently, good 
cross-national data are hard to find. We therefore rely on a set of findings from a 2007 survey 
on satisfaction with liberalised services across the EU commissioned by the European 
Commission DG Health and Consumers. Survey results are from 2006 and include various 
aspects of service consumers’ satisfaction with a number of services of general interest, such 
as electricity, gas, water, postal services, and fixed and mobile telephony. Consecutively we 
will report overall satisfaction scores which have been measured on a 10 point scale, where a 
high value (8, 9, 10) is coded as satisfaction. We report the percentage points of respondents 
that have indicated to be satisfied with the services they receive. 
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Figure 3.9: Satisfaction with electricity services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
 
Figure 3.10: Satisfaction with gas services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
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Figure 3.11: Satisfaction with water services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
 
Figure 3.12: Satisfaction with fixed phone services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
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Figure 3.13: Satisfaction with mobile phone services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
 
Figure 3.14: Satisfaction with postal services 
 
Source: Customer Satisfaction Survey 2007, European Commission, May 2007 
 
Compared to other countries, satisfaction with services of general interest in the Netherlands 
is comparatively low. In all service sectors, the number of respondents that have stated that 
they are actually satisfied with the service they receive is clearly below the EU15 average. 
However, there are some differences across sectors. While satisfaction with energy services in 
general is comparatively low, satisfaction with water services can be considered as moderate. 
However, in the case of mobile services consumers’ satisfaction is, again, comparatively low. 
As regards postal services and the fixed telephony sector, satisfaction is moderate-low. In this 
regard, the Netherlands repeatedly ranges among those countries one would traditionally think 
of as being low satisfaction countries such as Italy, Spain or Portugal. Reasons for this rather 
bad performance are indeed manifold; one possible explanation may be that along with 
liberalisation reforms, customers’ expectations towards the services they use is high, while 
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actual quality and service prices did not experience a similar increase – or even a decrease. 
This, in turn, may result in those relatively low satisfaction scores. 
 
3.2.2. Expected effects of opening for competition prior to liberalisation 
 
In 1997, the Eurobarometer surveys asked European citizens whether they thought opening 
services to such as rail transport, telephone services and gas and electricity supply for 
competition would be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the quality of these services. 
This is near the starting date of a large-scale opening up of national markets, and gives us an 
indication of popular sentiment at a time when many decisions on liberalisation and 
privatisation were taken or implemented. 
 
Figure 3.15: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the quality of 
telephone services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
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Figure 3.16: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the price of 
telephone services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
 
Figure 3.17: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the quality of 
electricity supply services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
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Figure 3.18: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the price of 
electricity supply services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
 
Figure 3.19: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the quality of 
gas supply services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
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Figure 3.20: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the price of 
gas supply services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
 
Figure 3.21: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the quality of 
rail transport services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
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Figure 3.22: Do you think that opening to competition will be a good thing or a bad thing with regard to the price of 
rail transport services 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
 
Figures across the EU show relatively high percentages of people thinking that opening up 
services would improve quality, especially in telephone services and rail transport. In the 
EU15, a majority also thought in 1997 that opening gas and electricity services for 
competition would improve quality.  
 The number of Dutch respondents expecting positive effects on quality in the rail 
sector and in telephone services was quite high. They also expected better prices in rail 
transport and telephone services. 
 The number of people expecting positive effects of inserting competition in electricity 
and gas supply services in the Netherlands was relatively low. In the electricity sector, the 
Dutch were even the most negative after Denmark with regard to expected quality effects of 
liberalisation. They were close to the EU15 average in terms of expectations about price 
evolution in the electricity and gas sector. 
 These findings can be interpreted in two different ways. These attitudes can reflect 
genuine attitudes towards inserting competition, or they can be interpreted against current 
levels of performance in these sectors. In other words, when just 47 per cent of Dutch 
respondents thought in 1997 that inserting competition in the sector of electricity supply 
would be a good thing for quality, this can mean many thought competition would be a bad 
thing, but it can also be interpreted as meaning that electricity supply services already were of 
high quality and that expectations of further quality improvements were low.  
 
A next set of figures shows more general expected effects of opening up public services to 
competition. Respondents were asked ‘Which of the following effects do you think might be 
brought about by opening to competition?’. 
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Table 3.1: Expected effects of competition 
 Creating 
jobs in these 
sectors 
Greater 
transparenc
y 
Job losses 
in these 
sectors 
Better 
service 
quality 
Lower 
prices 
Stopping 
non-
profitable 
services 
Greater 
attention to 
consumer 
needs 
Austria 42 28 29 46 55 37 36 
Belgium 44 19 20 51 70 33 45 
Denmark 28 9 43 44 70 37 45 
EU 15 39 22 24 50 60 31 39 
Finland 45 36 11 59 74 42 50 
France 38 28 29 49 65 37 42 
Germany 31 19 28 45 56 39 39 
Greece 37 21 18 53 48 17 34 
Ireland 41 14 18 48 59 16 37 
Italy 48 31 12 58 62 23 39 
Luxembourg 38 22 27 41 52 29 46 
Netherlands 47 36 24 58 69 44 56 
Portugal 42 24 14 52 50 13 32 
Spain 44 21 11 58 57 22 36 
Sweden 34 27 27 57 72 57 43 
UK 33 6 35 44 60 23 33 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 47.0, 1997 
 
The table shows that in the Netherlands, people had very positive expectations vis-à-vis more 
competition. They expected to see a greater attention for consumer needs, better quality, 
lower prices, the ending of non-profitable services, more transparency and more jobs. In 
countries such as the UK, Denmark and Germany, expectations were considerably less 
positive. Again, this can mean different things. These less positive expectations may indicate 
people had already observed negative effects (e.g. in the UK), or it may reflect that public 
services were already functioning quite well in these respects. 
 
3.2.3. Social and employment services: evaluation and preference for public or private delivery 
 
In this section, we first look at perceived quality and affordability of a number of social and 
employment services, and continue by looking at preferences for public or private delivery. 
The figures show that respondents in the Netherlands are quite positive about the quality of 
social care, long term care and employment services. They also tend to think these services 
are affordable. Positive evaluations overall are the highest in Belgium and Austria, and the 
lowest in Southern European countries. Perceived quality of employment services is low in 
Germany. Respondents tend to be the least satisfied with the affordability of services in 
Ireland and Greece. 
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Figure 3.23: Perceived quality of long-term care services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
Figure 3.24: Perceived quality of employment services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
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Figure 3.25: Perceived quality of social assistance services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
Figure 3.26: Perceived affordability of long-term care services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
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Figure 3.27: Perceived affordability of employment services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
Figure 3.28: Perceived affordability of social assistance services 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
We subsequently present a number of statistics about provision preferences among European 
citizens. With regard to social services, respondents in European countries were asked they 
thought the public sector, private sector or NGOs and charities should be primarily 
responsible for providing these. We subsequently show findings for long-term care services, 
employment services and social assistance services. 
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Figure 3.29: Preferred primary responsibility for providing long-term care services (%) 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
A preference for private sector/private firms as primary provider of long-term care services is 
extremely low in all countries. The same goes for NGOs and charities, with Germany and 
Austria as exceptions. In these two countries, respectively 11 and 15 per cent of respondents 
think NGOs and charities should be primarily responsible for providing long term care 
services. 
 We see a very similar picture for social assistance and employment services. Austria, 
again, is an exception with considerably higher preferences for provision of social assistance 
services by NGOs and charities.  
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Figure 3.30: Preferred primary responsibility for providing employment services (%) 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
 39
Figure 3.31: Preferred primary responsibility for providing social assistance services (%) 
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Source: Special Eurobarometer 355, 2010 
 
When interpreting these figures, it is important to remember that these questions only ask for 
primary responsibility. The low preference for private sector provision as primary provider 
does not necessarily mean respondents want no role at all for private sector. 
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